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This paper examines the variation across countries and evolution over time of life 
expectancy.  Using historical data going back to the beginning of the 20
th century several 
basic facts about the relationship between national income and life expectancy are 
established. The paper shows that even by examining the augmented Preston curve there is no 
indication that the Preston curve is “breaking down” and no indication from over 100 years of 
data that a very strong relationship between national income and life expectancy will not 
persist, particularly over the ranges of income of primary interest to the Human Development 
Report. 
    
Empirical findings show that there are actually fewer “puzzles” than might appear while 
trying to reconcile the strong cross-sectional association with the time evolution of life 
expectancy in specific countries and most of the existing “puzzles” come from using either 
very short time-horizons or very small moves in income per capita when the Preston curve is 
a long-run phenomena.   
   
The paper also discusses the phenomena of the cross-national convergence, with the life 
expectancy of the poorer countries increasing, in absolute terms, faster than those of the rich 
countries and how the findings about the augmented Preston curve relate to discussions of 
health policy.   
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  This paper examines the variation across countries and evolution over time of life 
expectancy.   
 
  The opening section examines the impact of national income, measured as GDP per 
capita in PPP, in Preston and augmented Preston regressions.  Rather than focus only on 
recent cross-sections since 1970 or so we use the available historical data going back to the 
beginning of the 20
th century (the data are taken from the series created for the GAPMINDER 
application and are described in the data appendix).  This long-run focus allows us to 
establish several basic facts about the relationship.  
  First, there has been a strong cross-national relationship between income and life 
expectancy for as far back as one can take the data.  In the simple double natural log Preston 
curve (life expectancy regressed on GDP per capita) the R-squared for the 21 countries with 
data was as high as .8 as early as 1927 and was at that level through the pre-World War II 
period.  The modern data sets with over 150 countries begin in 1952 and have availability 
every five years and in that data there has been a high and rising R-squared roughly ever 
since (once one controls for the AIDs affected countries).  
Moreover, with the modern data one can create an augmented Preston relationship 
adding women’s education and other variables (such as a variable to adjust for the onset of 
AIDS).  In the simple double log augmented Preston regression the R-squared rises from .63 
in 1952 to .79 in 2007.  There is a stable cross-sectional relationship in which countries’ life 
expectancy is now more tightly associated with the augmented Preston variables.  There is no 
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indication the Preston curve is “breaking down” and no indication from over 100 years of 
data that a very strong relationship between national income and life expectancy will not 
persist, particularly over the ranges of income or primary interest to the Human Development 
Report.  
  Second, the relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita is not linear and, 
while the non-linearity is reasonably well approximated by a double natural log specification 
we also estimated augmented Preston regressions allowing for quite general non-linearity by 
allowing for up to a fourth power in YPC.   In whatever functional form, per capita income 
has a strong and statistically robust association with life expectancy, especially over the range 
up to GDP per capita PPP$10,000.  Interestingly, with a more relaxed functional form than 
the constant elasticity imposed by the ln-ln form the association with income gets stronger 
medium levels of income than at the lower levels so there is no sense that the income impact 
“tapers off” (in elasticity terms), at least over these ranges.  The association appears to have 
been falling modestly over time, from an ln-ln elasticity of .10 in the early 1970s to around 
.08 today. 
  Third, much of the discussion is about trying to reconcile the strong cross-sectional 
association with the time evolution of LEX in specific countries.  Here we argue that there 
are actually fewer “puzzles” than might appear.  Many countries have seen improving LEX 
even with stagnant or slowly growth YPC but this is not a puzzle per se as the augmented 
Preston curve has shifted over time and so a country with stagnant per capita income, even if 
it stayed precisely on the predicted Preston curve, would improve over time.   
  Most of the other “puzzles” come from using either very short time-horizons or very 
small moves in YPC when the Preston curve is a long-run phenomena.  So the answer to the 
question of “How should I expect a country’s LEX to evolve over the long-run or as income 3 
 
grows rapidly over an extended period?” is “Pretty much along the Preston curve.”  The 
Preston curve is one of the most amazingly stable and robustly estimated relationships in 
economics.  Either countries’ long-run trajectories or long-period panel regressions with fixed 
effects show income elasticities that are remarkably, if not amazingly, similar to the cross-
sectional Preston curve.   For instance, the average ln-ln income elasticity from the cross-
sectional augmented Preston relationships from 1952 to 2002 is .112.  If one uses the 51 
countries for which there are observations before 1950 and which have at least 15 years of 
data the panel (changes on changes) estimate of the income elasticity is .110.  If one uses the 
27 countries with more than 50 years of observations to estimate the country specific income 
elasticity the median elasticity is .095 and 20 of the 27 country elasticities are within the 
range of .082 to .12.  We illustrate that a persistently high R-squared is consistent with a very 
narrow range of long-run trajectories for countries—if countries own LEX-YPC trajectories 
differed one would expect the association to weaken over time.  
  However, if one attempts to use the Preston curve to guess what will happen over a 
year or two or over extended periods of stagnant growth then the answer is that, statistically, 
pretty much anything can happen, but without creating much of a puzzle.  That is the 
augmented Preston curve is a quite amazingly stable relationship but which is identified off 
of the massive cross-national differences in YPC.  But doubling per capita GDP per capita is 
predicted to increase LEX (in 2002) at low levels of income by about 3.5 to 5 years.  So any 
given country could have extended periods of moderate growth and either rapid or stagnant 
growth in LEX and not wander outside the confidence intervals simply because this would 
not trace out very much distance along the Preston curve.  Confusion can arise about 
reconciling the cross-sectional and time series evidence if one does not pay attention to the 
basics of statistical power and measurement error, which can lead to any relationship 
becoming “statistically insignificant.”  4 
 
  The second section of the paper discusses the phenomena of the cross-national 
convergence, with the LEX of the poorer countries increasing, in absolute terms, faster than 
those of the rich countries.  This might seem to create something of a puzzle as it is well 
known that YPC has been diverging in natural log units.  However, our decomposition 
analysis shows that there is actually not a tremendous puzzle as there has actually been 
almost no convergence in natural log of LEX—the variance of LEX was roughly the same in 
1982 and 2007.  
  The third section discusses how the findings about the augmented Preston curve relate 
to discussions of health policy.  Basically, however these debates about the relationship of 
income and mortality are resolved, the case for health policy and the formulation of health 
policy is not much affected as they much depend on much deeper and more sophisticated 
analytics and data than can be produced from cross-national comparisons.  
 
I)  Basics of the relationship of national income and life expectancy 
While there are a number of complications of moving from the household to the 
aggregated data that represent national averages, we find it conceptually easiest to frame 
expectations of what we would expect to find in the cross-national data by thinking about a 
single household
2
There are two ways of going about thinking about the causes of death.  One is to trace out 
specific medical causes of death as diseases and decompose that into probability of 
experiencing a given disease condition times fatality risk per disease condition.  The other is 
.  
                                                           
2  For simplicity a single unitary household even though there are obviously gender 
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to start from a model of household choice and see how risks of death are associated with 
household characteristics (without necessarily tracing it through specific disease conditions).  
Obviously eventually both should be reconciled (as disease incidence and fatality per 
incidence are both affected by conditions household face beyond their control plus household 
resources and decision making), but in this note we are focused mainly on the association of 
life expectancy with distal conditions not proximate causes. 
It is easy enough to outline four broad categories of household characteristics that will be 
associated with health outcomes and hence risk of pre-mature death. 
Command over material resources.  Command over material resources is going to matter 
for at least three reasons.  First, a variety of decisions about consumption are going to affect a 
households’ health status, even if those decisions are not taken primarily for health reasons.  
The quantity and quality of food, the quality of housing, the quality of water and sanitation 
facilities, the quality of clothing, are all associated with higher total consumption 
expenditures and potentially have positive health effects, even if health effects are not the 
primary reason—e.g. households might be better water connections for convenience with a 
consequence of lower cost of keeping things clean.  Second, people with more command over 
material resources can make purchases that avoid disease conditions.  Third, people with 
greater command over material resources are more easily able to seek treatment that improve 
outcomes, conditional on a disease—more effective curative care.  While sometimes the 
income is associated only with this latter, richer people get better (more prompt, more 
effective) curative care, this may only be a very small part of the explanation of an observed 
health-income link at the household level. 
Ability to utilize resources effectively.  A second component of a household’s health status 
is an ability to utilize resources effectively to promote health.  This includes a variety of 6 
 
things from knowing good health practices (e.g. sanitation), knowing effective responses to 
health conditions (e.g. knowing of ORS), the ability to know when to seek medical expertise 
and follow their guidance.   
These first two features are mainly features of the household itself.  Then there are two 
broad factors external to the household. 
Global technological capability.  In health, as in many other domains, the application of 
science and technology has made technologically possible a variety of interventions of both 
preventive (e.g. effective immunizations), low-cost curative (e.g. ORS, penicillin and 
antibiotics), and high cost curative (e.g. heart surgeries).   
Domestic Health Public Policy.  The government can affect the ability of households in a 
huge variety of ways, from health promotion campaigns to disseminate information and 
encourage some behaviors (immunization, contraception, breastfeeding, sanitation) and 
discourage others (smoking, risky sex), to making preventive care services available (e.g. 
immunizations, targeted child nutritional services), to subsidizing curative care services either 
through direct production or through financing.   
These four are obviously just simple headings under which a great deal of complexity is 
hidden, but even this simple structure can be a helpful way of asking what we might expect 
from an exploration of the cross-national data.  
First, people demonstrably care a great deal about their health and the health of their 
children.  They also have a variety of other needs, wishes, wants, desires but avoiding death 
and remaining healthy is clearly an objective of nearly everyone.  This would mean we 
should expect people with more command over resources to have better health status and less 
pre-mature deaths.  In fact, it would be truly stunning of it were not true.   7 
 
Second, education, and in particular, women’s education one would expect to be strongly 
associated with health, of both adults and children, for a huge variety of reasons.  Again, it 
would be stunning if a measure of women’s capability to process information and utilize 
resources effectively to pursue their objectives were not strongly related to health status. 
Third, a president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge, an unquestionably rich and 
powerful man of his day, had a son die at 16 years old from an infected blister on his toe in 
1924.  There is no question that science and technology continuously expand the frontiers of 
the possible.  It would be stunning if the health status on average did not improve over time, 
even for people of the same income and personal capability.  How this translates into cross-
national differences depends on how technological frontier expands and how knowledge and 
practices diffuse across countries. 
  These first three factors are well known and are the basics of a cross-national 
decomposition of a measure of average health status of a population, such as infant or child 
mortality or life expectancy.   Below we will use these to explore the plain and augmented 
“Preston curve” (the cross-sectional relationship between national income and life 
expectancy) and its shifts over time in order to understand the evolution over time of health 
status cross-nationally (and why it has converged while income has diverged). 
  The more complex question is what we would expect to be the relationship between 
“public policy” broadly taken at the national level and measures of pre-mature death—like 
child mortality or life expectancy.  We return to that question only in Section III. 
I.A)  Standard factors explain high proportion of variance, increasing over time 
We start examining the relationship between life expectancy and real per capita income 
by estimating the Preston curve. In his pioneering study, Samuel Preston (1975) investigated 8 
 
the influence of economic conditions on life expectancy for a cross-section of countries and 
found the relationship to hold at different points in time (1900s, 1930, and 1960s). There are 
two  basic facts that became well-known as a result of Preston’s analysis. First, the 
relationship between income and life expectancy is non-linear and concave. Second, Preston 
curve shifts upward (e.g. life expectancy improves at a given income) at all income levels 
over time. These specific features of the Preston curve reveal the importance of 
improvements in income for the poorest countries where small changes in income per capita 
are associated with larger improvements in life expectancy as well as the importance of 
technological progress (and effective domestic health public policy).  
The importance of income per capita for life expectancy in Preston’s and later studies has 
challenged the conventional view on the role of health policy and specific health 
interventions as being the only factors that have improved life expectancy in low income 
countries (Deaton 2007).  Filmer and Pritchett (1999) find that these have extraordinarily 
high ability to explain health differences across countries:  only six economic and social 
factors (average income, income inequality, women’s education, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, the predominance of Muslim population and regional dummies) produce an 
R-squared of .95 and hence explain essentially all of the cross-country variation in infant and 
child mortality
3
We start by estimating this basic Preston relationship going back into history and 
estimating a Preston curve every five years for the 1902- 2007 time period. We estimate the 
.  
                                                           
3 This is a data set with only “high quality” observations on child mortality, which eliminated from the standard 
data sets observations based on extrapolations.  Obviously these add noise and lower potential explanatory 
power.  Even in this data set Filmer and Pritchett (1999) use data on repeated household survey estimates of 
child mortality for the same period to suggest that pure measurement error in child mortality likely accounts for 
between 2.5 and 5 percent of total cross-national variance.   This means the available ‘true’ variance 
unexplained by these factors was between 2.5 and 0 percent of the total. 9 
 
following equations, double natural log and quartic, both of which allow for non-linearity in 
the relationship in the absolute levels of the variables:  
ln(LEX) it = α + βln ln(YPC it ) +  εit              (1) 
Where:  
ln(LEX it) is the natural logarithm of life expectancy for country i
th at time t
th  
ln(YPC it) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP) for country  i
th at time t
th 
εit is the error term with standard errors clustered at country-level  





t i k q t i YPC LEX .
4
1
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We are going to being with the ln-ln functional form as existing studies show that the life 
expectancy/income per capita relationship is non-linear and that the double log 
transformation appears to be roughly appropriate. Moreover, coefficients expressed in logs 
facilitate interpretation and comparisons (Filmer and Pritchett 1999).  But the quartic form 
also allows for considerable flexibility in the non-linearity and we can compute elasticities at 
various levels of GDP per capita to compare with the log-log without imposing the constant 
elasticity assumption of ln-ln.     
To estimate the long run relationship between income and life expectancy we rely on data 
sources for which a description is provided in the appendix. Data on life expectancy at birth 
is available for a limited number of countries in the long run, and for a larger sample starting 
in 1952 when the data of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs start 10 
 
becoming available. On the other hand, income per capita data are based on Penn World 
Tables 6.2 and World Development Indicators and Angus Maddison’s historical statistics for 
the long run. These collections of demographic and income statistics have the advantage of 
being comparable across countries and available over longer than a century. We acknowledge 
that data on life expectancy is not always high quality data particularly for the early years of 
the twentieth century and for the poorest countries, and this may be an issue when examining 
changes over time
4
Regression results are presented in table 1. We show coefficients of ln-ln and quartic 
estimations as well as elasticities of the quartic at different income levels. It is possible to 
observe the existence of a stable relationship over the century. By looking at the estimated 
coefficient of the ln-ln regression we can observe that the elasticity has been stable and also 
that life expectancy has increased at all income levels over the century. While it is not really 
possible to compare the pre and post 1952 results due to the very different samples, it is that 
case that, among the countries for which there are data, the R2 was around .8 from 1927 to 
1947,  and rose from .54 in 1952 to around .6 from 1977 to 2007.  
. 
Even if we allow for a more flexible functional form and we look at the quartic 
regressions we can observe quite stable results. Income elasticity has been declining over 
time. The quartic specification provides a only slightly better fit than the ln-ln functional 
form, the R
2 is higher for the polynomial in every year. 
                                                           
4 Pritchett and Summers (1996) provide a discussion on the life expectancy variable as well as on the advantages 
and possible limitations of using international datasets.  Deaton (2007) describes how an accurate measurement 
of adult life expectancy requires the existence of a vital registration system which is still missing in many low-
income countries.  11 
 
Table 1: Basic Preston curve in double-log or quartic shows a high R2 since at least 1922 
 
   
ln-ln 
specification 
Elasticity at various levels of Income per capita 
using the quartic functional form 
R2 of 
quartic in 
YPC  Year  N  β   R2  1250  2500  5000  10000 
1902  15  0.239  0.319  0.708  0.488  -0.286  5.434  0.466 
1907  15  0.320  0.515  0.078  0.975  -0.687  6.857  0.683 
1912  15  0.244  0.462  0.238  0.362  0.093  2.010  0.489 
1917  14  0.233  0.303  0.510  0.217  0.350  11.755  0.412 
1922  20  0.351  0.606  -0.207  0.645  0.014  6.438  0.694 
1927  21  0.305  0.805  0.234  0.433  0.286  1.045  0.826 
1932  21  0.316  0.862  0.210  0.437  0.289  1.014  0.887 
1937  25  0.263  0.765  0.066  0.316  0.391  0.196  0.837 
1942  22  0.314  0.804  0.331  0.438  0.357  -0.196  0.886 
1947  24  0.251  0.793  0.314  0.344  0.233  -0.006  0.846 
1952  151  0.177  0.541  0.182  0.246  0.235  0.074  0.615 
1957  152  0.165  0.554  0.164  0.226  0.221  0.067  0.621 
1962  153  0.157  0.565  0.151  0.211  0.207  0.060  0.620 
1967  158  0.140  0.553  0.135  0.193  0.198  0.049  0.603 
1972  171  0.124  0.559  0.079  0.131  0.180  0.158  0.585 
1977  174  0.120  0.594  0.096  0.152  0.191  0.128  0.666 
1982  174  0.118  0.663  0.089  0.142  0.180  0.127  0.705 
1987  174  0.115  0.715  0.094  0.146  0.175  0.105  0.748 
1992  188  0.115  0.622  0.094  0.143  0.170  0.098  0.687 
1997  188  0.112  0.657  0.089  0.138  0.166  0.102  0.678 
2002  191  0.113  0.611  0.076  0.123  0.162  0.131  0.617 
2007  185  0.106  0.590  0.062  0.103  0.142  0.129  0.593 
 
A strong association between income per capita and health mortality outcomes (i.e., life 
expectancy, infant and child mortality) is now widely accepted. Yet, there is no universal 
agreement on the mechanisms through which income may affect life expectancy and on the 
relative importance of different factors that affect life expectancy (Bloom and Canning 2007). 
Pritchett and Summers (1996) suggest that the relationship between income per capita and 
health outcomes is causal by using as instruments variables that have been shown to be 
associated with growth but which are arguably not associated with health except insofar as 
they affect income (i.e., terms of trade shocks, the ratio of investment to GDP, black market 
premium for foreign exchange and the deviation of the official exchange rate from its 12 
 
purchasing power parity level), although it should be pointed out that it is not exactly clear 
what instrumented cross-national regressions identify
5
In the existing literature other factors apart from income have been found to have a 
positive effect on health outcomes. We are going add to the basic regression some non-
income components to estimate what we call an augmented-Preston curve. Specifically, we 
are going to include the following explanatory variables: 
.   They estimate a medium run income 
elasticity from long period panels for infant and child mortality in developing countries 
between around -0.4 (smaller the shorter the period).  
Women’s Education: higher levels of women’s education appear to be positively related 
with different positive health outcomes such as decrease in infant mortality and increase in 
life expectancy (Behrman and Deolalikar 1988; Pritchett and Filmer 1999); beneficial effect 
on a child’s health, schooling and adult productivity (Behrman 1997; Strauss and Thomas 
1995); larger beneficial effect than would adding to a father’s schooling of the same amount 
(King and Hill 1993). We are going to use women’s average years of schooling from Barro 
and Lee (2001). Years of schooling are preferred to other education variables that are either 
bounded or measure the flows such as literacy and enrollments (for a discussion on the 
advantages/shortcomings of the flow/stock education variables see Woessmann (2003)).   
Predominantly Muslim:  following Caldwell (1986), Filmer and Pritchett (1999) we 
include an indicator that takes into account the fact that Islamic countries exhibit high infant 
mortality and high death in childbirth rates. We use a dummy variable equal to one if the 
                                                           
5  We are not assessing the evidence that health might have some impact on economic performance as some 
regressions have suggested that lagged indicators of health status are associated with future growth.  In contrast, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) use the international epidemiological transition in the 1940s which led to a 
variation in changes in mortality rates across countries as an instrument and show that there is no evidence that 
improvements in life expectancy led to faster growth in income per capita.   Our point is only that the 
relationship between health and income cannot by fully accounted for by “reverse causation” as estimates that 
account for this potential channel show equally strong associations. 13 
 
share of Muslim population is greater than 90 percent in 1900 from Barro and McCleary 
(2005). 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence: we need to control for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
and the Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) given the fact that in spite of 
income and health improvements, starting from the 1980s the spread of HIV/AIDS has 
significantly reduced life expectancy in some Sub-Saharan states (Wilson 2001; Neumayer 
2003). Moreover, some scholars have attributed the divergence in life expectancy in the 
1990s largely to the effect of HIV/AIDS (e.g., Goesling and Firebaugh 2004; Neumayer 
2003; Ram 2003). We therefore include a variable that measures the share of the population 
in the 15-49 age-group infected with HIV over 1979-2007. Before 1979 we are going to 
assume that HIV/AIDS was equal to zero given the fact that the first recognized cases of 




The sources and methodology used to construct these variables are discussed in the appendix.  




ln(LEX it) = α + βln ln(YPC it) + δ Xit+ εit           (2) 
or 
t ii t i
k
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ln(LEX it) is the natural logarithm of life expectancy for country i
th at time t
th  
                                                           
6 Even if scientists were able to isolate and discover what is believed to be the first case of AIDS in 1959 it 
seems reasonable to assume that a significant spread of the disease has not occurred until the late 1970s. 
7 We can only estimate the augmented Preston curve for a shorter time period as data on women’s education is 
only available from 1950 onwards.  Also, we have to extrapolate women’s education for 2007.  14 
 
ln(YPC it) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP) for country i
th at time t
th 
Xit is the vector of control variables (Women’s Education; Predominantly Muslim; AIDS 
Prevalence) 
εit is the error term with standard errors clustered at country-level  
α is a constant,  βln, βk, δ are coefficients to be estimated 
 
We show the regression results of the estimation of the augmented-Preston curve in Table 
2. The inclusion of the additional variables lowers the estimated income elasticities slightly 
(as to be expected from adding positively correlated variables).  
The comparison of the estimated elasticities from the regressions that include the fourth 
power of YPC and hence allow income elasticities to vary rather than imposing the constant 
elasticity of the ln-ln specification reveal the pattern that the income elasticity is lower at very 
low levels of income (in the 2002 results, .051 at income of 1250 versus .087) then higher 
(.116 at YPC of 5000) then declining again.  But at YPC of 10,000 the elasticity is almost 
equal to the constant elasticity estimate.  The quartic elasticities decline at a slower pace than 
the ln-ln elasticity. With respect to the previous regressions we can observe that life 
expectancy elasticities in the ln-ln regressions with controls decline faster starting from 1962 
whereas after the predicted life expectancy is higher in the regression with controls.  15 
 
Table 2: The Augmented-Preston Curve shows a high and rising R-Square since 1950 
   
Ln-ln 
specification 




YPC  Year  N  β   R2    1250    2500    5000    10000 
                 
1952  151  0.180  0.637  0.158  0.218  0.212  0.066  0.675 
1957  152  0.169  0.642  0.142  0.200  0.200  0.062  0.678 
1962  153  0.122  0.702  0.111  0.154  0.138  -0.011  0.734 
1967  158  0.113  0.677  0.104  0.146  0.136  -0.015  0.717 
1972  171  0.102  0.667  0.058  0.097  0.134  0.112  0.684 
1977  174  0.100  0.681  0.075  0.112  0.148  0.085  0.734 
1982  174  0.097  0.760  0.075  0.118  0.146  0.087  0.798 
1987  174  0.098  0.793  0.079  0.121  0.143  0.074  0.822 
1992  188  0.091  0.677  0.070  0.110  0.134  0.081  0.740 
1997  188  0.086  0.745  0.064  0.101  0.125  0.076  0.777 
2002  191  0.082  0.796  0.051  0.083  0.112  0.087  0.806 
2007  185  0.087  0.795  0.050  0.084  0.116  0.102  0.806 
Note:  N: number of countries included in the regression; β ln-ln spec: YPC coefficient in the ln-ln specification; R2: R 
squared in the ln-ln specification; elasticity of the quartic regression at different income levels ($1,250, $2,500, $5,000, 
$10,000); R2: R squared in the quartic specification 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the R2 of the augmented Preston regression.  There is no evidence of 
a “weakening” of the augmented Preston relationship as in the last two years of estimates, 









Figure 1: Fit (R
2) of the Augmented Preston Curve Has Risen Over the Last 50 Years 
 
Note: regressions include controls (HIV/AIDS share, predominantly Muslim share, Women’s 
education); Results extracted from Table 2 
 
There are three points to be made about the goodness of fit in the basic and 
“augmented” Preston regression.   
First, apparent weakening of the LEX/YPC relationship in the simple Preston since 
1982 in table 1 is entirey due to the impact of HIV/AIDS.  If we just reproduce the basic 
Preston regression excluding the countries with large HIV epidemics (greater than 2 percent 
of the population affected) then instead of the basic Preston R2 falling from .715 to .590 from 
1987 to 2007, the R2 remains much more steady, falling only from .718 to .706 (with the 
initial fall from 1987 to 1992 perhaps due to the inclusion as new countries the former Soviet 
Union countries).  So there is no particular mystery here, if one looks at the basic scatter-plots 
of LEX and YPC it is obvious that countries like Botswana are massive outliers.  But a region 
specific negative shock to health lowering the overall cross-national association does not 
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Second, the incremental explanatory power of the added variables, particularly in the 
pre-HIV era is quite modest.  The main variable that we are able to add is women’s education 
(that is, we could not add income inequality with sufficient coverage).  One might ask 
therefore whether the explanatory power is coming from YPC itself or the correlation of YPC 
with women’s education.  On this there has actually been an interesting shift over time, as 
seen in table 2b.  Essentially in the early years there was near zero correlation of women’s 
education and YPC and hence nearly all of the augmented Preston explanatory power came 
from income alone as the augmented Preston variables without income gave almost nothing.  
Over time there were two changes.  One, the HIV/AIDS variable had more explanatory 
power (and that of income fell due to that exogenous shock as explained above).  Two, the 
correlation with women’s education and YPC rose steadily.  This implies, given the simple 
mechanics of multivariate regression imply that the ability to disentangle the relative 
contributions falls (as when YPC is omitted OLS will naturally load the omitted variable on a 
correlated variable).  But the data is consistent with YPC alone carrying most of the 
explanatory load and of roughly equal magnitude (correcting for AIDS).   
Table 2b: The Augmented-Preston Curve, fit (WITHOUT and WITH income in the 
regressions)  




R2 of Ln-ln 
specification 
with YPC 
(same as table 2) 
R2 of basic 
Preston (table 
1) 
Correlation between  
GDP per capita and 
Women’s Education 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
1952  151  0.058  0.637  0.541  0.042 
1962  153  0.365  0.702  0.565  0.218 
1972  171  0.365  0.667  0.559  0.263 
1982  174  0.463  0.760  0.663  0.418 
1992  188  0.488  0.677  0.622  0.420 
2002  191  0.660  0.796  0.611  0.448 
Note:  N: number of countries included in the regression; R2: R squared in the ln-ln specification. We need to 
interpret with caution results for 2007 as the women’s education variable has been extrapolated (an explanation 
on the method used is provided in the appendix) 
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  Third, to us the real puzzle is not that the R2 is high (as we explain below, one would 
expect from standard theories of choice that this fit be very good) but that it is so modest 
compared to the value of say, .95 found by Pritchett and Filmer (1999) for child mortality.  
Before assuming that if these factors explain 80 percent of the variation perhaps “health 
policy” even potentially explains the rest there are several considerations.  One, the coverage 
of this data is massive, which means all manner of extrapolation has been made to achieve 
this coverage as reliable, death reporting based life expectancy estimates exist for relatively 
few developing countries.  Moreover the income variable of GDP per capita is also measured 
with considerable error as a proxy for what perhaps ideally should be present the purchasing 
power of the typical consumer.  Both of these types of measurement error will reduce the R2 
(even if the “true” fit were perfect).  Experimentation with different samples shows that 
excluding for instance just the very small countries (which may be particularly prone to 
measurement error) can increase the Basic Preston cross-section results by as much as .07 
points.  Second, there is a simple mathematical relationship that if the relationship between 
health status is ln-ln at the individual level then the correct aggregate specification is not the 
log of the average but the average of the logs (but the latter requires household data).  The 
magnitude of the gap between the log of the averages (log of GDP per capita) and the average 
of the logs is itself a measure of inequality.  So we know we are excluding a factor that 
should be present, inequality (even if inequality has no direct causal effect on mortality).  
This also lowers the achievable R2.  All in all, .8 must be considered a lower bound on how 
much the simple measures of command over resources and women’s education explain and 
this level is not in and of itself evidence that any other factor even potentially explains the 
rest, it really could just be measurement error and excluded non-health policy related factors 
(e.g. susceptibility to disease conditions form geography).   
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I.B)  Functional form of the LEX association with per capita income 
This section shows that the relationship with LEX and YPC is in an augmented Preston 
regression is (roughly) double natural log (ln-ln) and is definitely not linear.   
Allowing for the YPC to enter with up to the fourth power allows for a quite flexible non-
linear relationship.  We calculated the elasticities implied by the quartic across four doublings 
of YPC over roughly the range of the “developing” countries (PPP 1,250 to 10,000 which 
spans from roughly Haiti, Nepal, Tanzania at the low end to Uruguay, Serbia, Costa Rica at 
the upper).  Compared to constant elasticity formulation imposed by the ln-ln form the 
elasticities are lower at the lowest levels, then rise to be higher than the ln-ln at roughly the 
median of the sample ($5000) and then decline again until at $10,000 the elasticity is roughly 
at the ln-ln value (slightly lower in some years, slightly higher in others).   
As seen above from the results of the R2 this additional flexibility in the specification of 
YPC does not gain a tremendous amount in overall goodness of fit.      
Table 3: augmented Preston curve: elasticities 
 
Year        N 
β ln-ln 
spec     1250     2500     5000     10000 
1952  151  0.180  0.158  0.218  0.212  0.066 
1957  152  0.169  0.142  0.200  0.200  0.062 
1962  153  0.122  0.111  0.154  0.138  -0.011 
1967  158  0.113  0.104  0.146  0.136  -0.015 
1972  171  0.102  0.058  0.097  0.134  0.112 
1977  174  0.100  0.075  0.112  0.148  0.085 
1982  174  0.097  0.075  0.118  0.146  0.087 
1987  174  0.098  0.079  0.121  0.143  0.074 
1992  188  0.091  0.070  0.110  0.134  0.081 
1997  188  0.086  0.064  0.101  0.125  0.076 
2002  191  0.082  0.051  0.083  0.112  0.087 
2007  185  0.087  0.050  0.084  0.116  0.102 
Note:  N: number of countries included in the regression; β ln-ln spec: YPC coefficient in the ln-ln 
specification;  : elasticity of the quartic regression at different income levels ($1,250, $2,500, $5,000, 




Figure 3 shows both the evolution over time of the estimated income elasticities for 
the ln-ln form and calculated from the quartic at $1250 and $5000.  Interestingly, these 
trended downward until 1972 (from .18 to .102) and then have roughly stabilized (falling 
only from .102 to .087 in the subsequent 35 years).  The elasticities have been consistently 
higher at $5000 and lower at $1250, though the gap has narrowed modestly.  
Figure 3: Elasticity of the augmented- Preston curve 
 
 
  The main point of the non-linearity of the functional form between LEX and YPC is 
that it implies that absolutely nothing can be inferred about the relationship or its 
reliability from simple comparisons of the two variables.  In particular, comparing the 
changes of the two variables in levels one can expect a small correlations even if the 
trajectories of both variables follow exactly the path the non-linear functional form over 
time would predict.  This is important, as it is easy to imagine that the scatter-plot of 
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the relationship in levels and the relationship in changes might suggest something of a 
puzzle—but this intuition is only reliable if in fact the underling relationship is linear. 
  To illustrate this point a simulation exercise will be helpful as a simulation helps 
make clear exactly what is going on as every single aspect of the evolution of the 
simulated variables is exactly understood.  With a simulation we don’t have to worry 
what about the complex things going on in the world that might explain the behavior of 
the data as we control the “data” exactly so we also understand it exactly.  For the 
simulation we use the HDR 2005 data for life expectancy and for GDP per capita.  We 
estimate both a quartic functional form and an ln-ln form, both of which produce results 
very similar to those reported above.  As discussed the quartic produces a different 
pattern of non-linearity as the quartic allows for a much “flatter” slope in countries with 
high YPC.   
  Then we simulate new “data” by assuming that countries have economic growth over 
the next N (where N=10 or 25) years with the growth rate of each country drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean of 2 ppa and a standard deviation of 2 ppa (which is 
roughly the actual historical growth rate distribution).  Then we predict LEX N years 
from now by assuming either: 
(a) the predicted LEX follows exactly  the cross-sectional relationship estimated 
today,  that is, the cross-sectional Preston curve is exactly stable and countries fall 
exactly on this predicted relationship (so that the simulated R-squared is 1) or  
(b) we simulate a random error such that the cross-sectional R2 N years ahead is 
roughly constant.   22 
 
In either case it is clear that in the simulated data there has been no “break-down” in the 
Preston curve or “puzzle” about countries trajectories of YPC and LEX—they have 
moved in ways consistent with a stable unchanging cross-sectional relationship between 
YPC and LEX.  
  In this simulated data with a perfectly stable and even with a perfectly predictive 
Preston relationship over 25 years the correlation of changes in the absolute levels of 
LEX and changes in levels of YPC is small.   Even for a long horizon of 25 years and 
even assuming the fit is perfect 25 years ahead the R-Squared of regressing the simulated 
changes in the level of LEX on the simulated changes in the level of YPC gives an R-
Squared of .061.  Some might think that this is a “puzzle” as the R-squared in changes is 
an order of magnitude smaller than the R-Squared in levels.  But there is no puzzle as this 
is exactly what one would expect from countries moving along the existing cross-
sectional relationship because it is non-linear and countries tend to the regression line.  
  Even if one allows for percentage changes, there is still the issue that even with a 
stable, constant and common parameter cross-national relationship that predicts the future 
LEX based on future YPC perfectly the R-squared in changes is only .136 for the quartic 
model and only .177 if one uses the ln-ln estimated model.  Variations in the simulation 
like making the horizon shorter (shown for 10 year horizons) or allowing for a constant 
cross-national R-Squared (shown in rows below) naturally make the “changes” R-
Squared even lower.   
That even with a perfect fit in the correct ln-ln specification the R2 would be so low is 
perhaps counter-intuitive, but has a simple explanation.  Suppose the current R2 is only 
.65 which means some countries are above the regression line and others below it.  If the 
R-squared is going to be perfect in the future then those above the line have to move 23 
 
down to the line and those below have to move up.  Therefore the changes in the ln(LEX) 
are dominated not by the changes in ln(YPC) but by the return towards the regression line 
(as in a simple error correction model).   
 
Table 4:  Simulations show that very low associations in changes (either in levels or in 





















































































N=25 years  N=10 years 
Level in T and 
T+N 
Change T to T+N  Level in T and 
T+N 
Change T to T+N 
(actual 
data) 
Level  Absolute  Percent  (actual 
data) 
Level  Absolute  Percent 
Based on simulation of 
future data 






.675  1  .061  .136  .675  1  .009  .033 
Equal 
R-2 
.675  .560  .040  .096  .675  .674  .008  .022 
Ln-ln  Perfect 
fit 
.651  1  .177  .166  .651  1  .061  .040 
Equal 
R-2 
.651  .65  .090  .097  .651  .65 
 
.031  .023 
Notes:  R-squared values from simulation are averages over 1000 iterations.  The simulation 
assumes country future growth rates are drawn from a normal distribution.  Future LEX is 
predicted based on the existing estimated coefficients (plus an error term when the R-squared 
is not 1).  The results in the quartic are based on truncating the predicted values for only those 
countries under $50,000 YPC so as to not force the model to predict far out of sample at the 
top range.   
 
The beauty of simple simulations of data is that there are no “puzzles”—so we 
demonstrate that small correlations in “changes” and high cross-national associations in 24 
 
levels based on constant coefficients with a non-linear functional form are perfectly 
consistent and are not a “puzzle” at all.  This is of course not proof of anything, there may 
well be another model, in which the Preston Curve has broken down, or is strikingly 
heterogeneous across countries that does explain a lack of correlation, but this does illustrate 
that a low changes on changes R2, in and of itself,  implies  nothing  about the long-run 
stability of the relationship.  In this simple example, once countries were exactly on the line 
then it could be that in the next period the changes on changes R2 would be a perfect fit even 
though the R2 in the previous period was low (as countries in the previous period were just 
getting back to the line).    
I.C) Shift of augmented Preston curve over time 
One of the well established facts is that Preston curve has shifted upwards over time so 
that, at any given income (or given levels of all characteristics in the augmented Preston) life 
expectancy is higher over time.  One conventional interpretation of the shift of the Preston 
curve is that improvements in medical practices, new vaccines, immunization and overall 
technological progress which are not related to per-capita income in particular countries have 
increased people’s life expectancy.  
Our work is consistent with previous evidence about the Preston shift and we only make 
two points.  First, the pace of the Preston shift does not appear to have accelerated over time, 
but rather is roughly constant, or, in the quartic specification, accelerated, then decelerated in 
the 1970s to 1990s and then accelerated again.  Figures 4a and 4b show that there has been an 
upward shift since 1952. However, there is no evidence that, in either level or log terms this 
has been accelerating, if anything decelerating. 
 25 
 
Figure 4a: Shift in the augmented-Preston curve (intercept in ln-ln) 
 
 
Figure 4b: Shift in the augmented-Preston curve (intercept in quartic) 
 
 
With the augmented Preston curve, there have been increases life expectancy at all 
income levels, but more in the quartic than in the ln-ln specification and more at higher than 
at lower income levels and more in early periods that later periods (Table 4b).  That is, when 
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the quartic specification one can compare whether there the overall progress was “biased” in 
a particular direction.   
 
Table 5: Evolution of the predicted values from the Augmented Preston curve at various 
levels of income is a measure of the improvement in the possible 
 
Predicted values, in years, from Augmented Preston (at constant values of all other 
variables) at various levels of YPC 
Year  $1250  $2500  $5000  $10000 
         
1952  43.8  50.6  60.8  67.6 
1957  45.2  51.5  61.2  68.1 
1962  46.7  51.6  58.5  61.3 
1967  48.4  53.2  59.9  63.2 
1972  51.1  53.9  58.8  65.5 
1977  51.9  55.5  61.6  68.5 
1982  51.4  54.9  60.6  66.8 
1987  55.5  59.4  65.6  71.8 
1992  57.4  61.2  67.4  73.7 
1997  59.5  63.2  69.2  75.4 
2002  61.5  64.6  69.8  75.9 
2007  61.4  64.3  69.0  74.8 
Based on the regressions presented in table 2. 
 
   
Table 6 shows the interesting pattern that progress at the levels of the poorest 
countries was more rapid in the earlier period than more recently (comparing 25 year periods) 
when compared to the richer, but still developing level income, countries.  So in the period 
from 1952 to 1977 the predicted LEX at low levels of income grew by 8.1 years while at the 
middle levels of income, 5,000 and 10,000 it grew hardly at all, while in the more recent 
period the curve shift was higher in absolute terms at low levels (9.7 versus 8.1) but 
accelerated massively at the higher levels of income to be roughly equal in the absolute gains 
across levels of income.  27 
 
 
Table 6:  Early improvements came primarily at low incomes whereas 
more recent progress was more uniform 
 
 
Absolute change in predicted 
level of LEX at various level 
s of income  
 
Percentage change in 
predicted LEX at various 










1250  8.1  9.7  18.5%  18.6% 
2500  4.9  9.1  9.7%  16.4% 
5000  0.9  8.1  1.4%  13.2% 
10000  0.9  7.4  1.3%  10.8% 
 
  Table 5 can also be used to examine the question of decomposing the overall observed 
progress in LEX between that which could be attributed to pure “expansion of the frontier” 
(the shift of the Preston curve) and that component which could be attributed to income 
growth (movement along the frontier).  The obvious point is that this decomposition will vary 
across time (as the degree of progress has shifted) and level of income and by the pace of 
growth—so there is not answer to the question of the relative importance of income versus 
generalized health gains.  For instance, a country which followed exactly the predicted 
pattern from 1952 to 1977 and doubled their income from $1250 to $2500 (which doubling 
requires a 2.85 percent rate of growth) would see the life expectancy increase from 43.8 to 
55.5, an 11.7 year gain.  Had their income been constant it would have improved to 51.8 
(reading down the column of table 5), a gain of 7 years, whereas had the Preston curve not 
shifted the income gain would have been 7.6 years to 50.6 (reading across the column).   In 
this case “most” of the gain, even with growth was due to global “technological progress” in 
health.  In contrast, a country that had improved by exactly that same proportionate income 
gain (doubling) but from 5,000 to 10,000 would have attributed nearly all the gain (from to 
61.7 to 68.5) to income growth because overall progress at those levels of income was slow.   28 
 
  Decomposing the actually historical progress—the question of “how much was due to 
technological progress?” is not a well-posed question because it is so contingent on growth.  
If a country has slow growth then nearly all of its gain will be attributed to “exogenous” 
improvements while another country starting from the same position will have nearly all the 
gains attributed to income if it grows very rapidly.   
I.D)  Reconciling cross section and time series in relationship of income and LEX 
One of the big questions about a cross-sectional relationship is whether it really 
represents the trajectory a country should expect to follow if that particular country 
experiences income growth.  There certainly are situations in which there appears to be a 
cross sectional relationship across countries but individual countries do not move along the 
cross-sectional relationship—a widely cited example is the oft cited Easterlin paradox that the 
cross-national relationship between GDP per capita and happiness is not reflected in countries 
improvement in happiness as individual countries improve their income (although this 
stylized fact is now contested by Stephenson and Wolpers 2008).   
  The relationship between LEX and YPC is completely different than the Easterlin 
paradox.  We present four pieces of evidence to argue that countries should expect to trace 
out almost exactly the Preston curve as their YPC increases and that there is strikingly little 
cross-national homogeneity in the estimated relationship of LEX and YPC.   We argue most 
of the confusion about the instability or unreliability of the Preston curve comes from using 
estimates with low statistical power, that is, estimating the Preston curve only over very short 
periods or with countries with low growth so that there is not sufficient variation in YPC to 
adequately identify the long-run relationship.     
Stability of estimates of cross-section versus (long-period) first differences.  If the 
LEX-YPC relationship is treated as linear in natural logs (ln-ln) then one can estimate the 29 
 
cross-sectional relationship in first differences and expect to recover the same coefficient.  
However, it has been known at least since Pritchett and Summers (1996) that moving to 
shorter and shorter first differences leads to two problems.  First, low statistical power as the 
distance traced out in the YPC space of the first differences for any given country gets shorter 
and shorter.  Second, measurement error increases, with its usual effects of attenuation bias.  
That is, no one really believes that the relationship is between LEX and GDP per capita 
exactly and instantaneously period to period.  Rather, GDP per capita is a crude proxy for the 
overall purchasing power of households and governments, so for instance changes in GDP 
over short periods that are driven by changes in investment but not consumption would not be 
expected to have the same impact as changes in consumption.  Similarly, there are almost 
certainly long and complex lags in the relationship between income and health so one need 
not expect the same impact of cyclical and trend changes.  Also, there are reasons to not 
expect exact symmetry, so that a one percent fall and one percent rise might not have exactly 
equal effects, especially in the short run (over which households might actively smooth 
consumption of other goods to protect health status).  Pritchett and Summers (1996) show 
that fixed effects regressions using ln first differences over different periods have the 
expected result that the estimated elasticity is lower the shorter the period (even though 
arguably the fixed effect regressions of all lengths “solve” the bias of unobserved country 
specific effects that might plague the cross section). 
Here we use the long-run historical data to estimate fixed effects regressions but only 
using countries with very long time series.  That is, we allow for country specific effects by 
using the first differences, but only use the first differences of countries where we have a 
sufficiently long period of observations we are confident the results are not predominated by 
measurement error.  Table 7 shows that using the long-period first differences recovers 
exactly the same coefficient as the cross-sectional estimates.  The elasticity in the long-period 30 
 
differences with controls (the augmented Preston) is .11 and the average elasticity from the 
cross-sectional estimates in the augmented Preston from 1952 to 2007 (reported in column 3 
of table 2) is also .11.  That is, if we ignore the cross-sectional variation entirely and estimate 
the augmented Preston curve using only  the data of how individual countries move,  we 
recover exactly the same coefficient (to the third digit, though this must be a coincidence)
8
Table 7:  Estimates of the LEX-YPC coefficient in ln-ln functional form with long-
period fixed effects are very close to those in the cross-section 
.   
  Without  With 
Controls
a 




from 1952 to 
2007 of the 
ln-ln cross 
section (col. 
3 of table 2)  
Income 
coefficient 
.115  .118  .103  .110  .110 
N  27
b  27
 b  51
c  51
 c  151-185 
a) controls include: aids share, Muslim dummy, life table (south) dummy [women's education has been excluded 
from the long-run regression as it is only available from 1950]; a time trend is included,  b) at least 50 years of 
observations, sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, 
France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia,  
c) at least 15 observations (at five year intervals) sample includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
 
  Estimates from long time series of individual countries.  The long-period panels still 
use cross-national variation and so the overall coefficient might be hiding individual country 
heterogeneity.  An alternative would be to use countries with long-times series on both 
indicators and estimate the relationship country by country using only the time series data.  In 
                                                           
8 Filmer and Pritchett (1999) noted the same result with child mortality.  Using data covering a 100 year span 
recovered exactly the same ln-ln coefficient as the cross-section.   31 
 
figure 5 we show the coefficient on YPC in LEX for the countries with more than 50 years of 
data.  It is striking both that the average individual country coefficient looks very similar to 
the overall cross-sectional estimates—the median coefficient is .095 versus the cross-
sectional average of .11.  Moreover, there is very little variation across the countries. Other 
than Mexico all of the countries fall in a narrow bound between .05 and .118.   
 
Figure 5: Long-run Country by Country augmented -Preston curve 
 
 
  Figure 6 shows the cross-sectional Preston curve estimated from long-period panels 
with the actual time series evolution of the data from Canada since 1900.  The slope of the 
evolution of Canada mirrors almost exactly the cross-sectional relationship. Of course, the 
difficult with the use of a single country is that one cannot separately identify the time series 














































































































































































































































Figure 6: Comparing the Preston curve with the long period time series evolution of 
Canada 
Left: Preston curve for the sample; Right: Preston curve for the sample and Preston curve for Canada 
 
Note:  sample of 51 countries (countries with at least 15 years of data).  Graphs have been truncated at the 2007 
average level of GDP per capita in the United States ($42,859).  
 
 
Stability of the long-run R2 and country heterogeneity.  We start from a basic point 
that we observed in an earlier section: an increasing R
2 in the cross-country regressions of life 
expectancy on income per capita, at least over the last 50 years of data for a common set of 
countries, and a high level of R-squared even 80 years ago. This fact itself has implications 
about the country trajectories.  If countries had very different long-run trajectories we would 
expect the cross section relationship to become weaker over time and then eventually the 
long-run relationship to fall apart. Therefore, it is actually difficult to square any very 
enormous heterogeneity in the LEX/YPC relationship with an increasing R
2. 
Again, a simple simulation exercise helps clarify the point as it makes the data 
completely under control to examine the implications of controllable features of the data.  We 33 
 
take a distribution of 100 units (“countries”) by YPC simulated to reflect the actual mean and 
standard deviation of YPC.  Then we assume that in the first period there is an exact fit of 
YPC and LEX (this is the opposite of the simulation above where we assumed perfect fit in 
the second period). Then assume that each individual country’s own income elasticity is 
drawn on a normal distribution around .10 but with different standard deviations.  Obviously 
if the standard deviation is exactly zero then every country moves exactly along the same 
trajectory and the R-Squared is always 1.  Assume that there is some country heterogeneity in 
the income elasticity, then as countries growth (even at the same rate) the R-Squared will 
decline as countries with the same YPC have increasingly different LEX (and hence 
var(LEX|YPC) grows).  Table 8 shows the evolution of the simple R-Squared if all countries 
grew at 2 percent per annum.  Any substantial heterogeneity in the income elasticity produces 
a substantial decline in the R-Squared over time.  For instance, if the distribution were such 
that even 10 percent of countries had a truly zero or negative income elasticity, this requires a 
standard deviation of .08 around a mean of .10 but in that case over fifty years of two percent 
growth the R-Squared would decline by .32 points.   34 
 
Table 8:  Simulation showing that heterogeneity in the YPC coefficient causes secular 
decreases in the cross-national goodness of fit 
 
  R-Squared in year 
 
Change in R-Squared 
(Actual is a .12 
increase from 1952 to 
2002 in the Basic 
Preston (excluding 
HIV/AIDS countries) 




Deviation of Income 
Elasticity Across 
Countries 
1  10  20  30  40  50 
Assuming perfect fit in period 1 and deterministic evolution of LEX country by country 
0  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.00 
0.02  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.98  0.97  -0.03 
0.04  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.95  0.92  0.88  -0.12 
0.06  1.00  0.99  0.96  0.91  0.84  0.77  -0.23 
0.08  1.00  0.98  0.93  0.86  0.77  0.68  -0.32 
0.1  1.00  0.97  0.88  0.76  0.63  0.52  -0.48 
 
 
Of course a simulation does not imply anything about the underlying data, but it does 
help to make clear the simple consequences of various assumptions.  Any very substantial 
amount of heterogeneity in the YPC-LEX relationship across countries would create 
tendencies for the fit between the two in cross-section to fall.  (As opposed to the quite 
substantial rise actually observed).   
Shorter period first differences.  What is clear from the above discussions is that the key 
question about using the differences over time to estimate the long-run relationship is how 
much of the dynamics are a return to the regression line and how much are a possible break 
down in the relationship.  With the actual HDR data (not the long-run data set from 
GAPMINDER we have been using for consistency) we illustrate how important the dynamics 
are.  Table 5 shows the regressions of the natural log first difference of LEX on the natural 35 
 
log first difference of YPC in three different specifications.  The first just runs the ln changes 
on natural ln changes—and one sees essentially no correlation.  The second column (II) 
simply adds the residual of the regression from 1970 ln(LEX) on 1970 ln(YPC)—how far a 
country was from its predicted value.  If there are strong “error correction” dynamics then 
this should be negative and suggest a return to the regression line.  Indeed, already change 
ln(YPC) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient—and the scatter plot Figure 4a 
reveals that there are several obvious outliers, each of which has an obvious explanation:  
GNQ has had massive increase in GDP per capita from oil, but which has hardly affect actual 
available command over material resources of the typical citizen, Liberia’s LEX has clearly 
had a massive recovery from an extremely low value due to conflict, and Botswana (BWA), 
South Africa (ZAF), Lesotho (LSO) and SWZ (Swaziland) have been affected by HIV/AIDS.  
If we just drop those six then column III and figure 4b show the results in which the 
coefficient on the change in ln(YPC) is exactly what the level regressions produce:  .0938 
from the changes regression 1970 to 2005 and .0928 from the average of the income elasticity 
coefficients from 1972 to 2007 reported in table 3.   36 
 
Table 9:  Regressions of the change in natural log of LEX on the changes in YPC 
produce nearly exactly the results of the cross-section, once one allows for “error 
correction” dynamics in countries returning to the steady state relationship (adjusting 
for a few outliers) 
  Raw First 
Differences 
First Differences 
including the 1970 
residual 
First Differences 





















N  150  150  144 
R2  .003  .247  .398 
Countries deleted  None  None  GNQ,BWA,ZAF, 
LBR,LSO,SWZ 
Note:  Using HDR data set.  
 
The four panels of figure 7 show the mechanics of the regression results very clearly.  
Figure 7a shows the raw scatter plot of the two variables.  Notice on the far right hand side is 
China with very high economic growth and middle of the pack improvement  in life 
expectancy.  Figure 7b shows the regression results from the ln levels in 1970.  Notice that 
China is very far about its predicted value (good LEX with low income).  Figure 7c shows the 37 
 
partial scatter plot of ln changes of LEX on ln changes of YPC, when the lagged residual is 
included in the regression—for instance China is closer to the regression line because one 
would have expected lower progress because it was so far above the predicted value at the 
beginning.  In Figure 4c the outliers are all very clearly far off the regression line, which is of 
course no reason to excise them, but once identified each has a clear reason to believe that 
their particularly trajectory should not be expected to generalize to other countries.  Figure 7d 
shows the regression with error correction allowed and the outliers deleted, in which the 
regression line is exactly the average of the cross-section regression averages over the same 
period.  
 
Figure 7:  With error correction first differences give exactly the levels results 38 
 
What about “exceptions”?   While there is just truly amazing consistency and 
homogeneity in the long-run income elasticity estimated from many repeated cross-sections, 
from long-period changes, or from individual countries evolution over time, there are always 
“exceptions”—countries that experience growth without LEX improvements or countries 
with LEX improvements but no growth.  However, imagining that these constitute 
“contradictions” or “puzzles” to a prediction that countries will, over the long-run, experience 
improvements with income growth of roughly the magnitude predicted by the augmented 
Preston curve is usually just a misunderstanding of statistical power and the standard errors of 
prediction (or, perfectly understandable reasons why YPC would fail as a proxy for the 
typical household’s command over resources).   
The Preston curve is actually quite flat.  Let us suppose the Preston curve in the 
relevant developing country range is well approximated by an ln-ln relationship with an 
elasticity of .10.  Then a 10 percent rise in per capita income implies a one percent rise in life 
expectancy, so for a country at the predicted value of LEX at $1250 of 61 years this is a gain 
of only .61 years.  If countries are growing at slow pace, suppose 10 percent growth took 10 
years, then this will be much smaller than the upward shift in the Preston and it could easily 
appear that “growth” had not impact.  That is, if countries grow at very low pace or 
experience fluctuations in GDP per capita growth the Preston curve is no longer a good 
predictor, in spite of being a good long-run predictor.  
This means that even at high R
2 levels and even if the Preston curve is exactly stable 
and exactly homogenous across countries so that every countries is “expected” to converge 
onto exactly the cross-sectional Preston relationships, there is a standard error around the 
regression predictions.  So think of the following thought experiment:  a country on the 
regression line has improvement in income per capita but no improvement in LEX (so in the 
Preston growth is not moving “northeast” along the Preston curve but is heading due west).  39 
 
How far would the country have to go before it became even a minor statistical anomaly (say 
was more than a single standard deviation from the regression prediction) and how long 
would that take.   The change income times the elasticity has to be greater than the standard 
error of the predicted life expectancy:   
βln*(%ΔYPC) >  std err (LÊX) 
If countries are growing slowly this means that the long-run relationship can be a 
good long-run predictor but, especially at slow growth rates not really be very predictive at 
all and it would take a very long time, around ten years, to detect this and in case of a very 
fast GDP per capita growth.  Our calculations are only meant to convey the general idea 
about this point.  We use the predicted results from our sample of 51 countries with long time 
series availability to calculate the elasticities and standard errors
9
More interestingly, even at growth rates of say, 5 percent per annum one could 
observe growth for 14 years with not LEX improvement before a country were an additional 
Std. Err. off of its projected trajectory.   
.  As this simple calculation 
shows, at slow rates of economic growth such as 1 percent it would take essentially forever to 
statistically detect a shift off of the Preston curve because the movement in the YPC is so 
absolutely small.   
                                                           
9 These regressions actually give us our most precise estimates as the R-squared is so 
high (over .9) and hence the standard error of prediction are quite low.   
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Table 10: Years of income growth with no LEX improvement needed to 
detect a statistically significant anomaly, at different growth rates 
 
LEX  cut-off 
point 
(std error) 
Annual YPC Growth 
    1%  5%  10% 
    Years of growth (t) at growth rate r with zero change 
in LEX before β*(1+r)
t>Std. Err. Prediction 
72  0.075  72  14.5  7.31 
Note: cut-off point indicates the point at a given life expectancy level beyond which any increase  
in income with no related increase in life expectancy would be detected as anomalous by being a standard error 
off of the prediction.   
 
  The empirical point to understand is that the Preston curve is precisely identified 
relationship because there is such enormous variation in income per capita—countries vary in 
income by over an order of magnitude and countries growing rapidly grow by an order of 
magnitude in a couple of decades and countries with steady growth change by an order of 
magnitude over longer periods.  This huge variation allows the precise identification of a 
quite stable and homogenous relationship that is accurately predictive over the range so that 
if one predicts LEX for Tanzania at $1000 (the 10
th percentile of countries) and Netherlands 
at $35000 (the 90
th  percentile) who differ by a factor of 35 in YPC then the predicted 
difference is likely to be quite close to the actual. 
  If one thinks of the Preston curve as a path leading Northeast (higher LEX with higher 
YPC) that also shifts North over time then as countries make substantial  progress East 
(higher YPC) relative to the scale of the map one can reliably predict their trajectory.   
However, if one takes annual changes in growth (and throws away the cross-sectional 
variation) this is like trying to identify the course of the Mississippi river by using only a few 
randomly selected stretches of 100 yards each.   Similarly, if countries have slow growth then 
even very long-periods will not trace out much distance and hence one will not be able to 
distinguish whether the country is, or is not, on the trail.   41 
 
  I.E) A small aside about causality 
  Nothing we have said has anything to do with whether health might also cause higher 
levels of income.  There is a wide variety of empirical evidence from historical comparisons 
(e.g. Fogel), econometrics, randomized experiments and just common sense that suggests that 
healthier people will also be more productive.  For the present purposes that is not the 
question.  The question might be whether the cross-national regressions we have reported are 
reported a causal impact of income or health or are the result of “reverse causality” and 
merely reflect the impact of health on income.  While we cannot go into this question in any 
depth, we think that the existing evidence is consistent with the view that the magnitude of 
the problem of reverse causality on the existing estimates is quite small, for two reasons. 
First, we do not have to contradict any of the existing evidence about a positive 
relationship between health and income to believe that the magnitude of such impacts do not 
present a major econometric issue of reverse causality in the existing cross-national 
estimates.  We are identifying the income impacts off of differences of up to two orders of 
magnitude so that even if one parsed out the reverse effects, even in the magnitudes the 
current micro and macro literatures might suggest exist (and which may be of sufficient 
magnitude to be of policy concern), the resulting estimates would be roughly similar.   
Second, all existing efforts  to “correct” the cross-national estimates for reverse 
causality using instrumental variables for identification are supportive of the view that the 
income estimates are roughly unaffected (both Pritchett and Summers 1996 and Pritchett and 
Filmer 1999) use the then standard approaches to IV and found results larger, not smaller, 
than the OLS results.  However in the current state of play we understand that people are not 
convinced by the available instruments (as meeting the conditions for an appropriate 
instrument in a cross-national setting is difficult if not impossible and “passing” the over-42 
 
identification tests is hardly compelling given their potentially low power with so few 
observations). 
Therefore, by not “correcting” our estimates for impacts of health on income we are 
not denying such exist, but this is a separate issue as to whether their magnitude and direction 
is sufficient to cause a massive re-interpretation of the results (and while there is evidence of 
health impacts there is absolutely no evidence on this latter issue and what weak evidence 
there is suggests it is not major econometric issue).      
   
II)  Convergence 
The “convergence” puzzle, which is related to the fact that in the long run we observe 
convergence in life expectancy but not in income per capita, remains one of the biggest 
puzzles in the economic growth literature. The lack of absolute convergence of income per 
capita has been extensively documented in the literature; evidence from the existing studies 
suggests that there is no convergence across countries, whether interpreted as absolute 
convergence or growth rates conditional on initial levels (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; 
Quah 1996; Boyle and McCarthy 1999). 
However, it is not so puzzling as it may first appear. First, there is absolute convergence 
(reduction in the standard deviation) in the levels of life expectancy and the logs only until 
1987 (table 11).  So since the specification is clearly non-linear there is not necessarily any 
puzzle as a shift up in the X with constant non-linear relationship would lead to a decline in 
the standard deviation of Y in absolute but not necessarily ln terms. 
While there has been some absolute divergence in some of the augmented Preston 
controls—particularly YPC, there has been convergence so it is not the case the Var(ln(LÊX)), 43 
 
the variance of the predictions, has gone up until 2002. On the other hand, we can observe 
that  Var(Life Expectancy) has declined until 1987 and then increased. We previously 
discussed how the spread of HIV/AIDS in low income countries may have caused this pattern 
as well as the increased mortality in countries of the former Soviet Union. Interestingly, 
Deaton (2006) shows how standard deviation of infant and child mortality continued to 
decline until 2004, being HIV/AIDS a disease that for the most part affects the adult 
population. On the other hand, Deaton (2006) shows that if the logarithm of infant and child 
mortality is considered, we can observe that the two variables started diverging in 2000. 
Becker et al. (2005) decompose the convergence in life expectancy in order to estimate 
the contribution of each factor and find that by limiting the analysis to the change in life 
expectancy explained by the change in income there is no evidence of convergence.    
  Since the income elasticity has been declining a bit, the impact of diverging YPC on 
predicting divergence has moderated, so the predicted divergence using the ln-ln beta from 
the 1960s (i.e., which is equal to .122 in 1962) would give more divergence than the .082 we 




Table 11: Decomposition of the shifts in the Preston Curve to examine convergence 
 

















1952  151  50.648  147.558  0.057  0.069  0.032  0.001025  0.000464 
1957  152  53.127  145.932  0.052  0.057  0.022  0.000847  0.000383 
1962  153  55.289  141.788  0.048  0.033  0.016  0.000490  0.000222 
1967  158  57.349  131.236  0.043  0.026  0.015  0.000386  0.000175 
1972  171  59.169  121.811  0.038  0.021  0.015  0.000312  0.000141 
1977  174  60.953  115.713  0.037  0.020  0.015  0.000297  0.000134 
1982  174  62.840  106.627  0.030  0.019  0.017  0.000282  0.000128 
1987  174  64.437  102.210  0.028  0.018  0.018  0.000267  0.000121 
1992  188  65.338  106.319  0.032  0.015  0.018  0.000223  0.000101 
1997  188  66.281  110.787  0.031  0.014  0.018  0.000208  0.000094 
2002  191  67.103  123.784  0.034  0.014  0.019  0.000208  0.000094 
2007  185  68.175  117.776  0.031  0.015  0.019  0.000223  0.000101 
Note: var (ln(LEX)): variance of ln of life expectancy; β1962=0.122; β2002=0.082. We need to interpret 
with caution results for 2007 as the women’s education variable has been extrapolated  (an explanation on the 
method used  is provided in the appendix) 
 
We now examine the variance of the explanatory variables included in the regressions in 
order to understand what is happening to the evolution of the distribution of the variance. Part 
of the explanation of the puzzle may be that some of the variables we are using as controls 
are diverging. Summary statistics are shown in table 12. 
We can observe that in addition to income per capita, also other non-income components 
included in the regressions are not converging. Specifically, the variance of the variable 
women’s years of schooling is increasing over time (in the first two years the variable on 
women’s education is only available for a limited number of countries: 1952: 17 countries; 
1957: 7 countries; 1962: 100 countries). The variance of the share of people affected by 
HIV/AIDS is also increasing over time. The sharp increase since 1992 is due to the fact that 
from 1992 onwards some African states experience a sharp increase in the share of people 
affected by HIV/AIDS (e.g., in 1992 only Zimbabwe had the share of population affected by 
HIV/AIDS greater than 15 percent; in 1997: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and 45 
 
Zimbabwe; in 2002: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). The reason why HIV/AIDS may have a strong impact on convergence is due to 
the fact that the disease is most widespread in low-income countries with relatively low life 
expectancies and survival rates. The evolution of the variance of the predominantly Muslim 
variable is related to the change in the sample composition.  






















1952  151  49.386  1.056  0.699  …  0.084 
1957  152  51.855  1.130  0.446  …  0.084 
1962  153  53.988  1.164  4.710  …  0.083 
1967  158  56.216  1.258  4.520  …  0.081 
1972  171  58.463  1.444  4.604  …  0.090 
1977  174  60.425  1.513  4.925  …  0.088 
1982  174  62.365  1.499  5.231  0.481  0.088 
1987  174  63.984  1.547  5.220  0.491  0.088 
1992  188  65.033  1.530  5.960  5.507  0.103 
1997  188  65.888  1.610  5.440  15.812  0.103 
2002  191  66.852  1.621  5.582  18.001  0.101 
2007  185  67.788  1.667  3.906*  15.894  0.105 
Notes *as described in an earlier section, where observations related to control variables (other than income) are missing 
the average value of the variable over the period has been imputed. We need to interpret with caution results for the 
variance of women’s education in 2007 as the variable has been extrapolated (an explanation on the method used  is 
provided in the appendix). 
 
 
III)  What Role for Public Policy in Pre-mature Mortality?  
The examination of cross-national differences in a measure of pre-mature mortality 
(either infant, child, or life expectancy) via an augmented Preston curve that includes 
aggregate per capita income, women’s education, allows for technological shocks (as the 
obvious and ubiquitous health correlates) as well as particular health shock (e.g. AIDS) or 46 
 
social characteristics then raises two important questions.  First, what is the role of a 
mortality based health status indicator in comparing well-being across countries?  Second, 
what is the role of cross-national comparisons in policy analysis or advocacy?  
We are not going to treat any of these questions at length, but we did want to make some 
points that are not quite intuitive and hence are sometimes confusing, if not confused, in 
policy discussions. 
 
  III.A)  Is pre-mature death price elastic?  
  The perhaps counter-intuitive point is that because economists believe that people do 
in fact care a great deal about their health, including pre-mature mortality as a separate 
indicator of well-being is unlikely to reveal the important differences in human well-being 
caused by differences in public policy with regard to health. Conversely, the view that one 
would expect large variations in pre-mature mortality across countries due to health policy is 
an implicit assertion that either (a) death is price elastic or (b) there are no other ways of 
avoiding pre-mature mortality other than through the public sector or public action.   
  The natural translation of “care a lot about” into economic terms is that capabilities or 
functionings about which people “care a lot” would have low price elasticities of demand.  
This means that price variations would be expected to cause large variations in the quantity 
consumed of goods about which people do not care a lot, perhaps for instance, goods for 
which there are many close substitutes or which, at the margin, are not so valuable.  While 
price variations in achieving functionings about which people do care a lot would be expect 
to change the total expenditures, perhaps by a large amount, but not actually change the 
observed quantity by very much.   47 
 
  So, just take a very simplistic notion of a demand curve for pre-mature mortality (not 
for “medical care” which is a very different thing).  This would have an income expansion 
path—people with higher total resources—would achieve longer life expectancies.  What 
about price variation?  What if it were cheaper to reduce mortality (relative to consumption of 
all else as an aggregate commodity)?  The amount by which mortality was reduced would 
depend on the price elasticity, which is dependent on that extent to which people were willing 
to substitute consumption of other goods for the extension of life.  In the extreme case of 
lexicographic preferences—which is an assertion that people “care a lot” about health--there 
would be zero price elasticity.  Table 13 just does some simple calculations (just 
multiplication) of how much one would expect a 50 percent reduction in the price of reducing 
pre-mature mortality to lower observed mortality.     
 








Effect of a simulated reduction in 
“price” of 50 percent  
Simulated R-squared of “price” 
variation in simulated LEX data 
(mean=65, std. dev.=10), uniform 
distribution of price variation with a 
90
th-10





.5  1 
0  0.0%  0.0  0  0 
.05  2.5%  1.6  .009  .020 
.10  5.0%  3.3  .034  .11 
,15  7.5%  4.9  .11  .361 
.20  10.0%  6.5  .249  .562 
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  An only slightly more complex calculation is to ask, what if there were notion of an 
aggregate price elasticity to an overall, country-wide, difference in the relative  price of 
avoiding pre-mature mortality (which is not necessarily the price of health care services) 
then, one could ask, how much explanatory power should we expect price variations to have?  
This is just a simple combination of how much price variability across countries and the price 
elasticity relative to the underlying variability (driven  perhaps by other factors such as 
income and female education).  The final columns of Table 12 show the R-squared of “price” 
in a simulated cross-national regression.  Again, if the price elasticity is very low then even 
substantial cross-country differentials (say a distribution with a 90
th-10
th percentile spread of 
a one log-unit difference) across countries in relative prices of avoiding pre-mature mortality 
(again, not “medical care”) are going to produce very low cross-national explanatory power. 
This is consistent with empirical findings.  Filmer and Pritchett (1999) show that for 
child mortality the standard augmented Preston covariates (income, women’s education, 
income inequality, a set of regional binary variables and a binary indicator of predominantly 
Muslim countries) explained essentially all of the explainable cross-national variation—the 
R-squared was around .95 while the pure measurement error in the child mortality measures 
was around .025--without any inclusion of any indicator of health policy at all.  This is 
perfectly consistent with roughly lexicographic preference orderings over child mortality that 
would produce a very low elasticity of demand for avoiding child death.   
  This simple illustration is just to avoid the confusion that somehow arguing for a very 
high explanatory power of income on health somehow implies that “health is not important” 
to people or measures of well-being whereas it is in fact exactly the opposite.  To expect that 
“price” (via health policy for instance) or other factors are going to make large differences in 
pre-mature death across countries given people’s incomes (or more broadly command over 
resources) and capabilities of using those resources, which some health advocate seem to do, 49 
 
one has to argue either that pre-mature death is price elastic—which is the opposite  of 
arguing that health has enormous intrinsic important to people in assessing their capabilities 
and functionings—or that people ability to translate resources into health varies enormously 
across countries.  We argue that one expects high (and causal) associations of income and 
education with health because it is so important to people and hence we do not expect the 
price elasticity of pre-mature death is high.     
  This is also not an argument against investments in health policy that would assist 
people in improving their health.  Rather, we believe that because death is in fact very 
important to people we expect that most of the consequence of improving the price of 
avoiding death will be observed in people being able to consume other things and hence 
having higher consumption in other domains.  I will spend what I have to spend to stay alive, 
but the less I spend on that the more I can spend on food, clothing, housing, education.  Given 
the risk structure of life-threatening health conditions the consequences of better health policy 
will also be fewer people vulnerable to having to mortgage their futures to stay alive, and 
hence less overall vulnerability.  So the point we are making is not that health policy is not 
potentially hugely important, but that looking for the effects of better health policy in a 
“deaths” dimension may be not the right approach.  
  III.B)  Impact of public sector expenditures on health  
  There is no question that people place great value on their health status, as perhaps the 
single most important capability.  There is therefore also no question that effective public 
policies to help people improve their health status are therefore important.  However, it is 
very difficult to elicit from cross-national data that aggregate public expenditure on health 
has a large impact on observed aggregate health status.  This is not to say that there are not, in 
theory, public sector interventions or policies that would improve health status, it is just that 50 
 
these impacts of public spending are impossible to infer from cross-national data, for three 
fundamental reasons. 
  First, as studies of the cost effectiveness of various potential health policy 
interventions show, the impact on health status of interventions differs by several orders of 
magnitude.  So, while some expenditures that provide cheap and effective treatment of 
common diseases, like ORS, might have very high health status gain per direct cost, others, 
like very advanced treatments with small net health gains are enormously larger.  Filmer and 
Pritchett (1999) discuss that one possible explanation of the gap between the empirically 
demonstrated enormously cost-effective “micro” level interventions and the weak(ish) 
apparent impacts at the “macro” level may just be that countries differ substantially in the 
composition of their expenditures.  In this case the “realized” health gain per dollar might be 
very low in practice (if a variety of organizational and political economy pressures lead to 
high spending on higher cost items) even if the “potential” cost effectiveness is very high.  
  Second, which is more subtle and complex, is that all existing studies of cost-
effectiveness do not adequately differentiate between the cost-effectiveness of a health 
intervention (e.g. taking an aspirin, surgery, spraying for mosquitoes, iodizing the supply of 
salt) and the cost-effectiveness of a public sector intervention to promote health.  The key 
difference is that, since people do care about their health status they will take many actions 
on their own to promote their health.  Some government actions (those typically called public 
health) that provide public goods (in the economists sense of non-rival and non-excludable) 
the “with and without” health intervention and the “with and without public sector 
intervention” might look similar.  However, when the government provides private goods 
(rival and excludable) that promote health (e.g. nutrition, curative care) then there is at least 
some displacement effect.  The proper counter-factual for the impact of spending on a health 51 
 
intervention is not the magnitude of the health intervention uptake but is the magnitude of the 
net increase in the total consumption/participation/ uptake of the health intervention. 
  As Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (2000) show this displacement effect will vary 
widely, depending on whether the intervention is targeted, the supply conditions in the 
private sector, the consumer demand, etc.  Displacement can be anywhere between zero and 
full displacement.  But nothing  can be inferred from the cost effectiveness of a health 
intervention about the cost effectiveness of a public sector intervention without evidence 
about the counter-factual in the absence of the public sector intervention.   
  Third, governments of the world vary widely in their efficacy on average, and vary in 
their capability to undertake specific activities.  Some governments are quite capable of 
standard logistical tasks (like immunizations) or concentrated professional tasks (like 
surveillance) but have difficulty with undertaking activities that require “discretionary, 
transaction intensive” (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004) decision making to be successful.  
Ambulatory curative care or individualized promotion/behavioral change (e.g. breastfeeding) 
are examples of complex, non-logistical tasks. 
  So the expected positive impact on health status of public sector spending in country i 
can be (crudely) approximated by the expenditure share weighted average across all public 
sector interventions in health j of the product of (a) the health status impact of an increase in 
the net uptake of health promoting activity j, (b) adjusted for the displacement effect to 
estimate the net increase in the health promoting activity from the public sector intervention 
creating an expansion in the effective supply and (c) the efficacy of country i in translating 
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Where: 
j i, α  is the share of the activity j in the total budget of country i, 
j i, δ is the efficacy of country i in translating spending on activity j into effective supply, 
j i, θ is the proportion of the expansion of supply via the public sector intervention that 
translates into an increase in the total effective increase in the health promoting activity, 
j i, λ is the health status impact of an increase in activity j. 
  As Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett (2000,2002) articulate this creates a number of 
possible “weak links in the chain” of translating public sector spending into changes in health 
status. 
  Weak link (λ).  The budget could be disproportionately allocated to activities that, 
even if they are done effectively and even if they expand utilization, do not have much 
impact.  In many countries a good deal of spending is concentrated on hospital based care.  
While some hospital based care is “cost effective” in the narrow sense, much is not.   
(Moreover, the general purpose  of hospital based care is typically not generalized 
improvement in health status but rather a mechanism for reducing vulnerability to the 
economic shocks from high cost per episode diseases).   
  Weak link (θ).  The budget could be allocated into activities that, although they are 
effective the public sector spending largely displaces private sector spending.  In many 
countries spending on facilities that provide curative care often dominate the budget and 
detract from public health and health promotion activities.  But the public health activities are 
often those with low private displacement while curative care may largely substitute for 
private care and hence the net expansion in care may be small even for large public spending. 53 
 
  Weak  link  (δ).    A third possibility is that government spends resources without 
creating any effective services.  Deaton, Banerjee, Duflo 2003 documented in an extended 
study that tracked attendance in Rajasthan over a year that on any given day roughly half of 
the medical personnel being paid by the state were not at their post, confirming earlier 
estimates from a smaller number of visits (Chaudury et al 2005).  Obviously even if these 
personnel would have engaged in cost-effective activities and even if these activities would 
have raised overall uptake this is all moot if they don’t show up.   
  The point is not that governments cannot  undertake health activities that lead to 
enormously improvements in health of quite cost effectively.  Governments can, and do.  But 
not all governments do.  The efficacy of public spending on health status at any given time is 
going to be country specific depending on (at least) the four parameters above.  Assessing the 
efficacy is going to be complex as if involves at least three major disciplines—the health 
efficacy is the domain of public health experts, the displacement effects the domain of 
economists, the public sector efficacy (by activity) is  the domain of public 
administration/management and governance.  
  Moreover, if one were to know the efficacy of existing spending in a given country 
this would not be informative about most policy options, only the business as usual radial 
expansion in the budget.  But even in countries in which the efficacy of average spending is 
low there might be possibly very high marginal spending possible.  This does require realism 
however, as assuming that a government that has proved ineffective in a large range of 
existing activities can be effective in a new activity (without a specific causal account of why 
this would be so) can do what assumptions often do.  
  The final point is that it is not clear what any cross-national association between 
health status and public spending on health could even possibly reveal.  The coefficient in 54 
 
any regression is going to be, at best, some complex weighted average of the underlying 
parameters in the chain across countries.  Finding that this coefficient is low (as do Filmer 
and Pritchett 1999) simply reveals that the some weighted average of those parameters over 
the relevant country set is low, which, given what we know about many developing country 
governments overall efficacy and about budget allocations (often to curative care services 
often utilized by the richer portion of the population) it should not be surprising.  We would 
expect therefore that the coefficient is not  identifying some underlying deep structural 
parameter and hence should vary, as some papers have shown, across measures of the 
efficacy of the government and shares of spending in various categories.   
  III.C)  Policy impact and diffusion of health innovations 
    More broadly than the issue of the impact of public expenditures on health status is 
the question of how much cross-national variation in health status one should expect to be 
associated with cross national differences in health policy.  Alternatively, is there any reason 
to be “surprised” by a very high and rising proportion of cross-national variation explained by 
an augmented Preston curve?  This actually depends on the underlying “model” of policy 
adoption. 
  Suppose there is a innovation that unambiguously creates superior health status for 
countries with given resources and capacity.  This innovation could either be medical—such 
as the invention of effective immunizations—or technological—such as improvements in 
cold chain—or new information about health practices and how to the effectively promote 
them—such as how to promote avoiding risky HIV/AIDS behaviors.  Whatever the previous 
level of variation across countries, the early adopters would see improvements in health status 
relative to equivalently situated countries.  This would therefore decrease the augmented 
Preston explanatory power.   55 
 
  However, the next stage would be that other countries would, perhaps on the basis of 
its demonstrated effectiveness in another country, adopt (perhaps adapt) the innovation 
themselves.  If this adoption process followed common “S curve” dynamics, one would 
expect a few early adopters, followed by an increasingly rapid pace, followed by a few 
lagging countries that, for whatever reason (which could be temporary) are slow adopters.  
Then the explanatory power would be reduced temporarily and then revert (roughly) to its 
previously level as other countries adopted. 
  The point is that nothing about the potential effectiveness of health policy can be 
inferred from the cross-national variation in health status.  The situation in which one would 
“expect” a high proportion of health status variation to be associated with health policy 
differences is a “model” in which there are health policy options capable of producing large 
difference in health status for countries with populations of equivalent income (and its 
distribution) and individual capability (e.g. women’s education) and  for some reason 
countries do not adopt those policies.  Crudely put, the incremental R-squared is the product 
of “efficacy” of policy X (impact effect on health status, the “beta”) and the variation in 
adoption of X across countries.  With either zero or full adoption the incremental R-squared 
of policy could be zero even for very effective policies.   
  This means that, if one “expects” there to be large policy variation then one “expects” 
countries to not have adopted policies that would have led to large gains in well-being for 
their populations in a dimension of capability that people demonstrably do care a great deal 
about.  Of course, this is not implausible, as governments around the world span the range 
from benign and effective to malign and chaotic.   56 
 
  But it does imply one should expect to see these more as a narrative of the dynamics 
of the change in health policy, as some countries will be early (effective) adopters and others 
late than necessarily long-term levels.   
  This is especially so if potential health interventions have different “sizes” in some 
combination of efficacy and cost so that some reforms are “no brainers” (big population 
effects at low cost) while others are effective, but even when fully implemented will have 
modest aggregate impact or others will have impact but will be expensive and hence require 
much tougher choices on sacrifices to implement.  A common sense model of diffusion 
would suggest that the former, the high impact at low cost, will be adopted sooner and more 
widely than the latter.  Again, even if there are dramatically effective health policies, the 
cross-sectional differences in the long-run could be very small as countries differ only in 
long-run adoption on the more marginal innovations. 
  This also potentially can explain why one could observe more rapid progress in health 
status than in economic performance.  If the sets of policies and actions to achieve economic 
growth are less obvious, more particular, and face more difficult political economy for 
adoption than a progressing technological frontier in health then countries will stay near the 
world technological frontier (health status near their augmented Preston value) even though 
countries have very different trajectories in growth and some remain stagnant while others 
grow rapidly. 
 
  Conclusion  
  The augmented Preston curve is highly predictive of pre-mature death, as one would 
expect under any reasonable model of human behavior.   The convergence puzzle is not so 57 
 
puzzling given the non-linearity of the relationship between income and health.   It is almost 
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Appendix - DATA SOURCES 
 
Life Expectancy: life expectancy at birth is defined as the number of years a newborn child 
would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same 
Life expectancy is available yearly but for most countries it is available at a 5-years interval. 
It is a combination of data from two main sources: the Human Mortality Database (HMD) 
and the World Population Prospect (WPP): The 2006 Revision of the  United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The main source used is HMD as it provides 
data for single years. Where HMD data is missing for 2007, WPP data is included. The 
starting year from which data from the HMD is available varies across countries, ranging 
from 1871 for Sweden to 1970 for Taiwan, whereas the WPP data is available from 1952 
onwards. Life tables for the HMD have been constructed by first collecting data on annual 
counts of live births and deaths over the longest period available; data on population size 
below 80. Then estimates of the annual exposure-to-risk of death and death rates are pooled 
for different time periods and cohorts. Finally, life tables are constructed by computing 
probabilities of death and exposure to risk of death. A detailed description of the sources and 
techniques used are available at: www.mortality.org. Data from the WPP rely on the most 
recently available data sources, such as censuses, demographic surveys and population 
registers. The underlying mortality trends are based on the HMD for those countries for 
which the data is available, whereas for the majority of the other countries mortality where 
both national sources and HMD data is not available life expectancy is estimated on the basis 
of infant and child mortality data extracted from various sources to which different life table 
models are applied.  61 
 
For the remaining countries national statistical sources are used as well as the Human Life-
Table Database. Riley’s historical dataset represents the main source for the period 1902-
1947. For  the pre-1952 period Riley’s (2005) uses a mix of pretransition and transition 
estimates. Life expectancy estimates have been drawn from more than 700 sources (listed at: 
www.lifetable.de/RileyBib.htm). Historical population estimates have been extracted from 
Biraben (1979), Livi-Bacci (1992) and Maddison (2003). Further information on the 
construction of the dataset is available in the GAPMINDER publications (GAPMINDER 
(2008), “Documentation for Life Expectancy at birth (years) for countries and territories”)     
Source: GAPMINDER Application 
 
Income per Capita: The data is based on GDP per capita and is adjusted for Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPPs), as calculated in the 2005 round of the International Comparison Program 
(ICP) to adjust for price level differences across countries. The unit of measurement of GDP 
per capita is international dollars. 
Data have been extracted from several sources: UNSTAT, the Penn World Tables 6.2, the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the IMF World Economic Outlook and 
historical data from Maddison’s (2008) dataset. Maddison’s Historical Statistics for the 
World Economy represents the main source for the long run growth data, and are 
complemented by data from Barro and Ursua (2008) who have updated Maddison’s data with 
a focus on improving GDP per capita historical data at time of major crises. 
Further information on the construction of the dataset is available in the GAPMINDER 
publications (GAPMINDER (2008), “Documentation for GDP Per Capita by Purchasing 
Power Parities for countries and territories”)     62 
 
Source: GAPMINDER Application  
 
Women’s Education: number of years of schooling of the female population aged 15 and 
over.  
Data is available for a large number of countries over 1950-2000. It relies on census and 
survey information as compiled by UNESCO and other sources. Missing information on 
school attainment is filled by using information on school-enrollment ratios and the structure 
of population by age groups. The perpetual inventory method is used to construct current 
flows of population that are added to the benchmark stocks. The variable is available at 5-
year interval. Data for 2007 is not available. We therefore extrapolated women’s education 
from its recent past. That is, we used the growth rate in women’s years of schooling since 
1992 to provide estimates for the year 2007. This implies that our results for the year 2007 in 
the regressions where women’s education is used should be interpreted with caution.  
Source: Barro and Lee (2001) 
 
Predominantly Muslim: indicator variable equal to 1 if Muslim population is above or equal 
90 percent 
Barro and McCleary’s dataset includes measures of religiosity and is constructed by 
combining the following international datasets: World Values Survey (waves 1981-84, 1990-
93 and 1995-97), reports on religion by the International Social Survey Programme (1990-93 
and 1998-2000) and the Millenium Gallup Survey (1999). Information is complemented by 
the World Christian Encyclopedia (1982). 63 
 
Source: Barro and McCleary (2005)  
 
HIV/AIDS Prevalence: percentage of HIV infected people among persons 15-49 year-olds 
Data for the years 1990-2007 are extracted from the 2008 Global Report of the 
UNAIDS/WHO. This data cover most low and middle-income countries and provide 
comparable estimates of HIV prevalence. Data for high-income countries are complemented 
by national sources as UNAIDS/WHO mainly uses epidemic models that are less suited to 
measuring the spread of HIV/AIDS in high income countries. Consequently separate 
estimates for high income countries based on national longitudinal estimates and other 
sources have been used. 
Data for the years 1979-1989 are based on extrapolations from the UNAIDS/WHO data.  
National sources have been used for very small countries and for both countries with limited 
HIV assessment and countries with very low levels of HIV that are not included in the 
international statistics. Estimates are limited to countries with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Country-specific information on how the dataset has been constructed is available from 
GAPMINDER (GAPMINDER (2009), “Documentation for HIV indicators in Countries and 
Territories”).  
Source: GAPMINDER Application 